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Abstract—Currently widely used federated login (single sign-
on) systems, notably those based on OAuth 2.0, offer very
little privacy for the user, and as a result the identity
provider (e.g. Google or Facebook) can learn a great deal
about user web behaviour, in particular which sites they
access. This is clearly not desirable for privacy reasons,
and in particular for privacy-conscious users who wish to
minimise the information about web access behaviour that
they reveal to third party organisations. In this paper we give
a systematic analysis of the user access privacy properties
of OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect systems, and in doing so
describe how simple it is for an identity provider to track
user accesses. We also propose possible ways in which these
privacy issues could to some extent be mitigated, although we
conclude that to make the protocols truly privacy-respecting
requires significant changes to the way in which they operate.
In particular, it seems impossible to develop simple browser-
based mitigations.
Index Terms—OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect, Authentication,
Authorization, Privacy
1. Introduction
Since the OAuth 2.0 authorisation framework was
published at the end of 2012 [8], it has been adopted
by many websites worldwide as a means of providing
federated identity services (what we refer to here as single
sign-on (SSO)). By using OAuth 2.0, websites can reduce
the burden of password management for their users, as
well as saving users the inconvenience of re-entering
attributes that are instead stored by identity providers
(IdPs) and provided to relying party (RP) websites as
required. There is a correspondingly rich infrastructure
of IdPs providing identity services using OAuth 2.0; for
example, Ghasemisharif et al. [6] identified 65 IdPs among
the Alexa top one million websites in 2018. Indeed, some
RPs, such as the website USATODAY1, support as many
as six different IdPs.
The security of OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect is
therefore of critical importance, and it has been widely
examined both in theory and in practice [1], [3]–[5],
[10]–[12], [14]–[17], [19]–[25]. Previous studies (see, for
example, [10]–[12], [21]–[25]) show that, in practice, RPs
do not always implement OAuth 2.0 correctly; as a result,
many real-world OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect systems
1. https://login.usatoday.com/USAT-GUP/authenticate/?
are vulnerable to attack. A range of mitigations have been
proposed for RP developers [2], [13], [15], [25], designed
to help secure OAuth 2.0 and OpenID connect systems.
However, apart from the work of Hammann et al. [7],
discussed in greater detail in Section 4.3, relatively little
attention has been paid to the degree to which OAuth
2.0/OpenID Connect protects (or, fails to protect) user pri-
vacy. The purpose of this paper is to address this issue, i.e.
to thoroughly investigate the user access privacy properties
of both OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect, covering all the
relevant protocol flows.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 provides an introduction to the operation of
OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect. In Section 3, we provide
a systematic analysis of the user access privacy properties
of OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect. We discuss the causes
of the identified privacy issues and propose possible mit-
igations in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Background
2.1. OAuth 2.0
The OAuth 2.0 specification [8] describes a system
that allows an application to access resources (typically
personal information) protected by a resource server on
behalf of the resource owner, through the consumption
of an access token issued by an authorization server. In
support of this system, the OAuth 2.0 architecture involves
the following four roles (see Fig. 1).
1) The Resource Owner is typically an end user.
2) The Client is a server which makes requests on
behalf of the resource owner (the Client is the
RP when OAuth 2.0 is used for SSO).
3) The Authorization Server generates access tokens
for the client, after authenticating the resource
owner and obtaining its authorization.
4) The Resource Server stores the protected re-
sources and consumes access tokens provided
by an authorization server (this entity and the
Authorization Server jointly constitute the IdP
when OAuth 2.0 is used for SSO).
Fig. 1 summarises the OAuth 2.0 protocol. The client
(1) sends an authorization request to the resource owner.
In response, the resource owner generates an authoriza-
tion grant (or authorization response) in the form of a
code, and (2) sends it to the client. After receiving the
authorization grant, the client initiates an access token
request by authenticating itself to the authorization server
and presenting the authorization grant, i.e. the code issued
by the resource owner (3). The authorization server issues
(4) an access token to the client after successfully authen-
ticating the client and validating the authorization grant.
The client makes a protected source request by presenting
the access token to the resource server (5). Finally, the
resource server sends (6) the protected resources to the
client after validating the access token.
Figure 1. OAuth 2.0 — Protocol Flow
2.1.1. OAuth 2.0 used for SSO. As noted above, in
order to use OAuth 2.0 as the basis of an SSO system,
the resource server and authorization server together play
the IdP role; the client plays the role of the RP, and the
resource owner corresponds to the user. OAuth 2.0 and
OpenID Connect SSO systems build on user agent (UA)
redirections, where a user (U) wishes to access services
protected by the RP which consumes the access token
generated by the IdP. The UA is typically a web browser.
The IdP provides ways to authenticate the user, asks the
user to grant permission for the RP to access the user’s
attributes, and generates an access token on behalf of the
user. After receiving the access token, the RP can access
the user’s attributes using the API provided by the IdP.
2.1.2. OAuth 2.0 protocol flows. The OAuth 2.0 frame-
work defines four ways in which an RP can obtain an
access token, namely Authorization Code Grant, Implicit
Grant, Resource Owner Password, and Client Credentials
Grant. Each of these methods involves a distinct set of
protocol flows.
Two of the flows, i.e. Resource Owner Password and
Client Credentials Grant, are not relevant in the context
of SSO. The Resource Owner Password flow requires the
user to reveal his or her IdP account password credentials
to the resource owner, i.e. it requires a high level of trust
in the resource owner; this severely limits the adoption
of this flow. The Client Credentials Grant flow only
involves the client and the authorization server, i.e./ no
user interactions are needed in this flow. Also, no browser
redirection is performed in these two flows; the client
directly talks to authorization server.
As a result, and given our focus on SSO privacy issues,
in this paper we restrict our attention to the Authoriza-
tion Code Grant and Implicit Grant protocol flows, in
Figure 2. OpenId Connect — Protocol Overview
which browser redirection is required. Note that, in the
descriptions below, protocol parameters given in bold font
are defined as mandatory in the OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework [8].
2.2. OpenID Connect
OpenID Connect 1.0 [18] builds an identity layer on
top of the OAuth 2.0 protocol. The added functionality
enables RPs to verify an end user identity by relying on an
authentication process performed by an OpenID Provider
(OP) (for consistency, we refer to an IdP instead of an OP
in the remainder of the paper). In order to enable an RP to
verify the identity of an end user, OpenID Connect adds a
new type of token to OAuth 2.0, namely the id token. This
complements the access token and code, which are already
part of OAuth 2.0. An id token contains claims about the
authentication of an end user by an OP, together with any
other claims requested by the RP. OpenID Connect (see
Fig. 2) supports three authentication flows [18], i.e. ways
in which the system can operate, namely Hybrid Flow,
Authorization Code Flow and Implicit Flow.
2.3. Tokens
The tokens used by OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect,
notably the code, access token and id token, are key to the
operation of these protocols and also have major privacy
implications. We therefore next describe their structure
and content.
• An authorization code is an opaque value which
is typically bound to an identifier and a URL of
an RP. Its main purpose is as a means of giving
the RP authorisation to retrieve other tokens from
the IdP. In order to help minimise threats arising
from its possible exposure, it has a limited validity
period and is typically set to expire shortly after
issue to the RP.
• An access token is a credential used to authorise
access to protected resources stored at a third party
(e.g. the Resource Owner). Its value is an opaque
string representing an authorization issued to the
RP. It encodes the right for the RP to access data
held by a specified third party with a specific scope
and duration, granted by the end user and enforced
by the RP and the IdP. It is a bearer token; that
is, it can be used by any party that gains access
to it.
• An id token contains claims about the authentica-
tion of an end user by an IdP together with any
other claims requested by the RP. Claims that can
be inserted into such a token include: the identity
of the IdP that issued it, the user’s unique identifier
at this IdP, the identity of the intended recipient,
the time at which it was issued, and its expiry time.
It takes the form of a JSON Web Token [9] and
is digitally signed by the IdP.
2.4. RP Registration
The RP must register with the IdP before it can use
OAuth 2.0, at which time the IdP gathers security-critical
information about the RP, including the RP’s redirect
URI (redirect uri). This is the URI to which the UA is
redirected after the IdP has generated the authorization
response for the RA and sent it to the UA (for conve-
nience, we also refer to the redirect URI as the Google
sign-in endpoint). During registration, the IdP issues the
RP with a unique identifier (client id) and, optionally, a
secret (client secret). If defined, client secret is used by
the IdP to authenticate the RP in the Authorization Code
Grant flow.
2.5. Authorization Flows
2.5.1. Authorization Code Grant — OAuth 2.0. The
OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code Grant flow is very sim-
ilar to the OpenID Connect Authorization Code flow,
described below. This protocol flow relies on information
established during the registration process, as described in
Section 2.4. The protocol proceeds as follows.
1) U→ RP: The user clicks a login button on the RP
website, as displayed by the UA, which causes
the UA to send an HTTP request to the RP.
2) RP→ UA: The RP produces an OAuth 2.0 autho-
rization request and sends it back to the UA. The
authorization request includes client id, the iden-
tifier for the client which the RP registered with
the IdP previously; response type=code, indicat-
ing that the Authorization Code Grant method
is requested; redirect uri, the URI to which the
IdP will redirect the UA after access has been
granted; state, an opaque value used by the RP
to maintain state between the request and the
callback (step 6 below); and scope, the scope of
the requested permission.
3) UA→ IdP: The UA redirects the request received
in step 2 to the IdP.
4) IdP → UA: The IdP first compares the value of
redirect uri it received in step 3 (embedded in the
authorization request) with the registered value;
if the comparison fails, the process terminates.
If the user has already been authenticated by the
IdP, then the next step is skipped. If not, the IdP
returns a login form which is used to collect the
user authentication information.
5) U → UA → IdP: The user completes the login
form and grants permission for the RP to access
the attributes stored by the IdP.
6) IdP → UA → RP: After (if necessary) using
the information provided in the login form to
authenticate the user, the IdP generates an autho-
rization response and redirects the UA back to the
RP. The authorization response contains code, the
authorization code (representing the authorization
grant) generated by the IdP; and state, the value
sent in step 2.
7) RP → IdP: The RP produces an access to-
ken request and sends it to the IdP token end-
point directly (i.e. not via the UA). The re-
quest includes grant type=authorization code,
client id, client secret (if the RP has been is-
sued one), code (generated in step 6), and the
redirect uri.
8) IdP → RP: The IdP checks the code, client id,
client secret (if present), and redirect uri and,
if the checks succeed, responds to the RP with
access token.
9) RP → IdP: The RP passes access token to the
IdP via a defined API to request the user at-
tributes.
10) IdP → RP: The IdP checks access token (how
this works is not specified in the OAuth 2.0
specification) and, if satisfied, sends the requested
user attributes to the RP.
2.5.2. Authorization Code Flow — OpenID Connect.
As previously noted, the Authorization Code flow of
OpenID Connect has a similar sequence of steps to that
of the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code Grant. We specify
below only those steps where OpenID Connect differs
from OAuth 2.0 operation.
2. The RP produces an OpenID Connect authoriza-
tion request and sends it back to the UA. The
authorization request includes client id, the iden-
tifier for the client which the RP registered with
the IdP previously; response type=code, indicat-
ing that the Authorization Code Grant method
is requested; redirect uri, the URI to which the
IdP will redirect the UA after access has been
granted; state, an opaque value used by the RP
to maintain state between the request and the
callback (step 6 below); and scope, the scope of
the requested permission.
8. IdP → RP: The IdP checks the code, client id,
client secret (if present), and redirect uri and, if
the checks succeed, responds to the RP with an
access token and an id token.
9. RP → IdP: The RP verifies the validity of the
id token. If it is valid, the RP then passes the
access token to the IdP to request the desired
user attributes.
10. IdP→ RP: The IdP checks the access token and,
if satisfied, sends the requested user attributes to
the RP.
2.5.3. Implicit Grant — OAuth 2.0. The OAuth 2.0
Implicit Grant flow is very similar to the OpenID Connect
Implicit and Hybrid flows, described below. This flow has
a similar sequence of steps to the OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Code Grant. We specify below only those steps where
Implicit Grant differs from Authorization Code Grant.
2. RP → UA: The RP produces an OAuth 2.0
authorization request and sends it back to the UA.
The authorization request includes client id, the
identifier for the client which the RP registered
with the IdP previously; response type=token,
indicating that the Implicit Grant is requested;
redirect uri, the URI to which the IdP will redi-
rect the UA after access has been granted; state,
an opaque value used by the RP to maintain state
between the request and the callback (step 6); and
scope, the scope of the requested permission.
6. IdP → UA → RP: After (if necessary) using
the information provided in the login form to
authenticate the user, the IdP generates an access
token and redirects the UA back to the RP using
the value of redirect uri provided in step 2. The
access token is appended to redirect uri as a URI
fragment (i.e. as a suffix to the URI following a
# symbol).
7. RP → IdP: The RP passes access token to the
IdP via a defined API to request the user at-
tributes.
8. IdP → RP: The IdP checks access token (how
this works is not specified in the OAuth 2.0
specification) and, if satisfied, sends the requested
user attributes to the RP.
As URI fragments are not sent in HTTP requests, the
access token is not immediately transferred when the UA
is redirected to the RP. Instead, the RP returns a web page
(typically an HTML document with an embedded script)
capable of accessing the full redirection URI, including
the fragment retained by the UA, and extracting the access
token (and other parameters) contained in the fragment;
the retrieved access token is returned to the RP. The RP
can now use this access token to retrieve data stored at
the IdP.
2.5.4. Implicit Flow — OpenID Connect. As previously
noted, the Implicit Flow of OpenID Connect has a similar
sequence of steps to the OAuth 2.0 Implicit Grant. We
specify below only those steps where OpenID Connect
differs from OAuth 2.0 operation.
2. RP→ UA: The RP produces an OpenID Connect
authorization request and sends it back to the UA.
The authorization request includes client id, the
identifier for the client which the RP registered
with the IdP previously; response type=token
id token (id token is always returned in this
flow), indicating that the Implicit Flow is re-
quested; redirect uri, the URI to which the
IdP will redirect the UA after access has been
granted; state, an opaque value used by the RP
to maintain state between the request and the
callback (step 6 below); scope, the scope of the
requested permission and nonce, the value used
to associate a client session with an id token to
mitigate replay attacks.
6. IdP → UA → RP: After (if necessary) using the
information provided in the login form to authen-
ticate the user, the IdP generates an id token and
an access token if requested and redirects the UA
back to the RP using the value of redirect uri
provided in step 2. The id token and access token
are appended to redirect uri as a URI fragment
(i.e. as a suffix to the URI following a # symbol).
7. RP → IdP: The RP verifies the validity of the
id token. If it is valid, the RP then passes the
access token to the IdP to request the desired
user attributes.
8. IdP→ RP: The IdP checks the access token and,
if satisfied, sends the requested user attributes to
the RP.
2.5.5. Hybrid Flow — OpenID Connect. Again as noted
above, the Hybrid Flow of OpenID Connect has a similar
sequence of steps to the OpenID Connect Implicit Flow.
We specify only those steps where Hybrid Flow differs
from Implicit Flow.
2. RP→ UA: The RP produces an OpenID Connect
authorization request and sends it back to the UA.
The authorization request includes client id, the
identifier for the client which the RP registered
with the IdP previously; response type=token
id token code (code is always returned in this
flow, other tokens are returned only when re-
quested), indicating that the Implicit Flow is
requested; redirect uri, the URI to which the
IdP will redirect the UA after access has been
granted; state, an opaque value used by the RP
to maintain state between the request and the
callback (step 6 below); scope, the scope of the
requested permission; and nonce, the value used
to associate a client session with an id token to
mitigate replay attacks.
6. IdP → UA → RP: After (if necessary) using
the information provided in the login form to
authenticate the user, the IdP generates a code,
an id token or an access token if requested, and
redirects the UA back to the RP using the value
of redirect uri provided in step 2. The code, id
token and access token are appended to redi-
rect uri as a URI fragment (i.e. as a suffix to
the URI following a # symbol).
3. User Access Privacy Analysis of OAuth 2.0
and OpenID Connect
3.1. Scope of Analysis
In this analysis we consider only what an ‘honest but
curious’ IdP learns about the web access behaviour of a
single user, i.e. we do not address privacy issues relating
to use of websites. In particular we consider how readily
the IdP can determine the identity of the RPs with which
a user is interacting, simply by performing its legitimate
role in the protocols. Of course, revealing this information
may not be harmful for the user if the IdP is honest
and trustworthy; nevertheless, an honest IdP could still
use this information for website personalisation, e.g. to
deliver targeted advertisements. For example, if a user uses
Google Sign-in to log in to a music band’s web page, then
Google could use this information to deliver advertising
for new albums by this band.
It seems clear that hiding the RP identity from the
IdP was not a goal for the protocol designers. Indeed, it
is probably the case that many IdPs like this feature, since
it helps them build user profiles. Nonetheless, it is clearly
a privacy risk for the user, and this is why we have chosen
to investigate ways in which the advantages of OAuth 2.0
and OpenID Connect could be preserved whilst limiting
what an IdP learns about the identities of the websites
visited by a user.
The primary design goal of OAuth 2.0 and OpenID
Connect is to enable an RP to gain limited access to
an HTTP service either on behalf of the user or for the
purposes of the RP itself; there are no specific privacy
objectives of these protocols. In order to achieve the
design goals, the RP has to retrieve user data from the
IdP server; thus the IdP is able to track user activity at
an RP by monitoring its resource server. Moreover, in the
OpenID Connect protocol flows, as the id token contains
attributes of an end user, two colluding RPs could use the
id tokens they receive to link interactions belonging to the
same user, even without the help of the IdP. We now give
an analysis of the user access privacy issues that arise in
a range of scenarios.
3.2. Possible Privacy Goals
As has been mentioned previously, our focus on pri-
vacy is restricted to considering what an IdP can learn
about the identity of the websites which a user visits. This
seems a reasonable focus, given that the main objective of
the SSO systems we examine is to enable authenticated
sessions between a user browser and a website, and the
IdPs are typically not involved once such sessions are
established.
More precisely, in this paper, we are concerned with
the following two user privacy goals.
• User login unlinkability with respect to the
IdP. Given two honest RPs, RP1 and RP2, the
IdP cannot distinguish which of them the user
has chosen to log-in to. Meeting this goal could
prevent an IdP from building a website activity
profile for a user who uses the IdP to log-in to
multiple RPs.
• User information retrieval unlinkability with
respect to the IdP. Given two honest RPs, RP1
and RP2, the IdP cannot distinguish which of them
is accessing the user information stored at the IdP.
3.3. Privacy Issues in Registration
Both OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect require that the
RP registers with the IdP before it can use OAuth 2.0
or OpenID Connect services. During registration the IdP
gathers information about the RP, including the RP’s redi-
rect URI (redirect uri). The IdP also issues the RP with
a unique identifier (client id) and a secret (client secret).
Any one of these three values can be used to identify the
RP. Thus if a user’s activity can be linked to any of these
values then the IdP immediately knows the RP with which
the user is interacting, endangering both the privacy goals
enumerated above. In particular, if a code or access token
containing any of these three values is transferred to the
IdP, then the IdP can immediately determine the identity
of the RP.
3.4. Privacy Issues in Authorization Code Grant
As described in Section 2.5.1, the OAuth 2.0 Autho-
rization Code Grant is very similar to the OpenID Connect
Authorization Code Flow. The privacy issues described
below thus apply to both OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect.
There are several points within the protocol flow at
which an IdP could learn the identity of the RP with which
the user is interacting, as listed below.
1) Whenever an RP sends an OAuth 2.0 authoriza-
tion request (step 2 of Section 2.5.1) to the IdP
using the Authorization Code Grant flow, the
IdP can learn which RP the user is trying to
access by checking the client id and redirect uri
of the authorization request. After authenticating
the user, the IdP redirects the user to the RP (step
6). If a user uses the IdP to log-in to multiple RPs,
the IdP will learn the identities of all the RPs that
the user is accessing.
2) After the RP receives the authorization response
and the embedded code, it has to exchange the
code for an access token with the IdP (step 7).
During the exchange process, the RP has to reveal
information which reveals its identity, such as its
client id and client secret, to the IdP. The IdP
can then use this information to connect the user’s
activity to this specific RP, enabling the IdP to
track the user.
3) The access token used in both OAuth 2.0 and
OpenID Connect is a bearer token which encodes
the user’s id, its expiry time, and its intended
audience (the RP). IdPs such as Facebook2 and
Google3 (see Fig 3) provide APIs for RPs to
check the access token information. When an
RP retrieves the user’s attributes from the IdP’s
resource server (step 9) using an access token,
the IdP will learn both the RP identity and the
user attributes the RP is trying to access. The
IdP could use this information to track the user’s
accesses to the RP without the user being aware.
This is because the RP can retrieve user infor-
mation from the IdP using the access token, even
when the user is offline. When this occurs, the IdP
is obviously aware of the information retrieval,
and hence knows which RP is retrieving which
user’s information.
4) When using OpenID Connect, both an id token
and access token are issued to the RP in step 8.
As described in Section 2.2, an id token contains
claims about the authentication of an end user by
an IdP, together with any other claims requested
by the RP. It also contains the issuer and audience
of the token, which means the IdP is aware of the
RP identity when generating the id token. That
is, when an RP relies on an id token to grant user
2. https://developers.facebook.com/docs/facebook-login/
manually-build-a-login-flow#checktoken
3. https://developers.google.com/identity/protocols/
OAuth2UserAgent#validate-access-token
access to its services, the IdP is still able to track
the access behaviour of the user.
All four of the cases considered above threaten both
of the privacy goals described in Section 3.2.
3.5. Privacy Issues in Implicit Grant
The OAuth 2.0 Implicit Grant flow shares almost
all the privacy issues we have identified in OAuth 2.0
Authorization Code Grant. The only difference is that no
code is exchanged during OAuth 2.0 Implicit Grant. Thus
the second privacy issue described in Section 3.4 does not
apply to the Implicit Grant flow.
4. Discussion
4.1. Main Issues
Both OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect require that
a RP registers with the IdP before using the service.
At this point the IdP collects privacy-related information
(e.g. the redirect uri) which could be used to learn the
identity of the RP with which a user is interacting; it
additionally distributes information (e.g. the client id and
client secret) that could also be used to learn which RPs
a user is accessing.
All the (relevant) authorization flows of OAuth 2.0 and
OpenID Connect rely on user agent redirections. During
the authorization process, in order to deliver the response
to the RP, the IdP needs to know the web location (the
redirect uri) to which it must deliver the response. This
redirect uri immediately reveals the RP identity to the
IdP. This is the main reason why OAuth 2.0 and OpenID
Connect do not support the user access privacy goals
enumerated in Section 3.2.
Also, both the access token and id token contain the
RP’s identity. The IdP is aware of the token audience
when issuing such a token, and can use this information
to determine the number of users that have logged in to
the RP using its identity service.
At this point it is important to observe that a range of
middleware [2], [15] has been published to try to mitigate
both the vulnerabilities and the privacy threats posed by
incorrect OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect implementa-
tions. However, the privacy focus of these schemes is very
limited; they all restrict their attention to mitigating the
privacy threats that can be caused by leaking the id token
or the access token to unauthorised parties, and rely on
user agent redirection to deliver the authorization request.
As a result, none of them is able to address the privacy
issues we described above. That is, they are not concerned
with user access privacy with respect to the IdP, which is
the main focus of this paper.
Given the fundamental nature of the privacy issues we
have observed, and in particular their reliance on browser
redirections, it seems impossible to enhance the privacy
properties of OAuth 2.0 (and Open ID Connect) without
making some fairly fundamental changes to the way these
systems work. That is, while it would clearly be desirable
to introduce user-privacy-enhancing obfuscations into the
protocol flows at the UA without changing the ways in
which IdPs and RPs interact, as we clarify below all such
efforts seem to be blocked by the design of the protocol
flows. Indeed, it could even be that this is a deliberate
choice by the protocol designers. We therefore conclude
this paper by considering possible ways in which these
systems could be redesigned to enable greater user privacy
protection without significantly affecting the simplicity of
protocol operation.
4.2. Possible Mitigations
As described above, the main reasons why OAuth
2.0 and OpenID Connect are not user-access-privacy-
preserving is because they both rely on user agent redi-
rection and the IdP has to exchange privacy-breaching
information with the RP. In order to attempt to mitigate
these privacy issues, we have the following recommen-
dations for possible modifications to the design and/or
implementation of these systems.
4.2.1. Protocol Changes.
1) The registration process of OAuth 2.0 and
OpenID Connect needs to be redesigned to make
sure that the information exchanged by the IdP
and RP will not subsequently threaten user pri-
vacy. How this could be achieved is not imme-
diately clear, and remains an issue for further
research.
2) The audience attribute in both the id token and
access token needs to be removed from the token
itself. This will require the design of the pro-
tocol to be modified to ensure that no security
issues will arise after removing this attribute. In
particular, if the audience attribute is removed,
a malicious RP could use collected access token
and id token values to impersonate a victim user
to another RP.
One possible mitigation to this security problem
would be to use a challenge-response-based ap-
proach, e.g. requiring an RP to generate a random
value for each authorization request (functioning
just like the state parameter in OAuth 2.0), and
include this random value in the user’s RP session
as well as the access token and id token; this
would enable the receiving RP to verify that
the token was generated for it. As the value is
generated randomly, the IdP should not be able
to use it to build a profile of the RP.
4.2.2. Client-based Mitigations. Client-based middle-
ware (e.g. a browser extension) could be used to redi-
rect the OAuth 2.0 authorization requests and responses
transferred between the RP and IdP. Introducing such
middleware could prevent the IdP from learning where
the authorization request is coming from and where the
authorization response is sent to, thus helping to reduce
the privacy threats to users. Such a design change could
have the helpful by-product of largely mitigating the threat
of phishing attacks, a well-known threat vector for both
OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect.
Again, designing such middleware to ensure privacy
without introducing new security vulnerabilities is a non-
trivial issue, requiring further research.
Figure 3. Google OAuth 2.0 Token Information Endpoint
A further possibility might be to introduce a new
browser API specifically for SSO, that would enable RPs
to start protocol runs with an IdP of their choice. This
could address the issues caused by browser redirections.
Such a change could be supplementary to the standard
protocol, or be integrated into a modified protocol.
4.3. A Failed Example
The above proposals clearly need further development
in order to try to develop a completely privacy-friendly
SSO system. In particular, the precise security and privacy
properties of the modified protocols will need careful
analysis. We conclude this discussion by considering an
existing proposal for protocol modifications which, al-
though intended to address the privacy issues we have
discussed, unfortunately fails to do so effectively.
Hammann et al. [7] very recently proposed a privacy-
preserving modification to OpenID Connect. It involves
simply masking the client id, and then using the masked
client id to replace the original client id audience at-
tribute in the id token. This design is apparently based
on the belief that the client id is the only reason that
OpenID Connect does not meet the privacy goals we gave
in Section 3.2. However, this ignores the fact that the user
agent redirection (redirect uri) can also be used to enable
the IdP to learn where the authorization response is sent
to (as discussed in Section 3.4).
The Hammann et al. attack model assumes that the
IdP is honest but curious (i.e. exactly the model we
also assume), and the proposed modified version of the
OpenID Connect protocol appears to be based on the
assumption that client-side JavaScript code could be run
independently, i.e. without the involvement of the IdP.
Specifically, in steps 4-9 of the modified OpenID Con-
nect protocol (see Section 4.3 of [7]), the website which
uses JavaScript to conduct the privacy settings is under
the control of the IdP; this means the IdP knows every
parameter described in steps 4-9, including the client id,
which is the value that the modified protocol is designed
to hide from the IdP. That is the privacy goals are still not
met because the privacy threat caused by the user agent
redirection is not addressed.
This demonstrates the difficulty in devising modifi-
cations that effectively meet the privacy goals without
making very major changes to protocol operation.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have described serious user access
privacy issues that affect both OAuth 2.0 and OpenID
Connect. We also observed that it seems impossible to
develop simple browser-based mitigations that signifi-
cantly enhance user privacy with respect to the IdP with-
out changing the underlying protocols; that is, changes
are required to both the browsers and the protocols
to make OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect user-access-
privacy-friendly. We have therefore also outlined possible
modifications to the operation of OAuth 2.0 and OpenID
Connect that could help mitigate the main privacy issues.
However, these ideas are still at an early stage of develop-
ment and need considerable further work before detailed
changes to the protocols can be proposed.
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